이란 핵 합의 주요 내용 & 국제사회 반응

“세계의 심대한 안보 문제들을 다루기 위해 모든 나라가 협력할 수 있음을 보여줬다.” 반기문 유엔 사무총장의 말이다. 이란 핵협상이 타결되자 국제사회는 일제히 환영했다. 중동의 근본적인 불확실성이 제거된 것이자, 핵 비확산 체계의 성공적인 작동을 보여준 것이기 때문이다.

　

하지만 나라마다 ‘온도차’는 있었다. 서방은 합의를 반기면서도 난제들이 남아 있음을 강조, 이란에 대한 압박을 거두지 않았다. 앙겔라 메르켈 독일 총리는 2일(현지시간) 타결 사실이 전해지자 “이란이 핵무기를 갖는 것을 막는 데에 가장 근접한 합의”라고 했고, 로랑 파비위스 프랑스 외교장관은 “긍정적이지만 해결할 문제들이 여전히 있다”고 말했다. 

반면 러시아 외교부는 환영 성명에서 “민간 핵프로그램을 추구할 이란의 ‘조건 없는 권리’를 얘기해온 블라디미르 푸틴 대통령의 원칙이 담긴 것”이라며 이란이 중동 분쟁을 푸는 데 더 적극적인 역할을 할 수 있을 것이라고 덧붙였다. 왕이 중국 외교부장은 “세계에 가져다준 좋은 소식”이라면서 “대화와 협상을 통한 문제해결은 국제사회의 이익과 유엔 헌장에 부합하는 것”이라 말했다.

　

협상 타결을 막으려 안간힘을 써온 이스라엘의 베냐민 네타냐후 총리는 트위터에 “이번 합의는 이스라엘의 존립을 위협할 것”이라는 글을 올렸으며 3일 긴급 안보회의를 소집했다. 그러나 이스라엘 유력 일간지 하레츠는 네타냐후야말로 잘못된 전략을 이제는 수정해야 한다”며 미-이란 사이에서 ‘훼방놓기’로 일관해온 네타냐후 정부를 비판했다. 

　

사우디아라비아의 살만 국왕은 버락 오바마 미 대통령과의 통화에서 “핵협상 합의가 중동과 세계 안보를 강화해줄 것”이라며 일단 축하를 보냈다. 하지만 사우디아라비아와 아랍에미리트연합(UAE) 등 걸프 아랍국들은 이란을 극도로 경계해왔다. 알자지라방송은 이들 ‘오랜 우방국’을 안심시키는 게 오바마의 과제가 될 것이라고 지적했다.

마침내 타결됐네요...

아래는 미국 국무부가 공개한 이란 핵 합의내용 factsheet 입니다.

이란의 핵 시설과 핵 활동 제한

• 원심분리기 19,000개는 3분의2 감축하고 1세대 모델(IR-1) 6,104개만 남긴다
• 최소 15년간 3.67% 이상 우라늄을 농축하지 않으며 저농축우라늄(LEU) 보유고 1만kg도 15년 동안 300kg으로 줄인다
• 가동 중단된 원심분리기와 농축시설은 국제원자력기구(IAEA) 감시를 받으며, 15년간 농축시설을 새로 짓지 않는다
• 핵물질의 무기화에 필요한 시간을 현재의 2~3개월에서 최소 1년으로 늘어나게 한다

원자로와 재처리

• 15년간 포르도 핵시설에서 우라늄 농축이나 관련 연구를 하지 않으며, 핵분열 물질도 두지 않는다
• 나탄즈 핵시설에서만 10년 동안 우라늄을 농축할 수 있으며, 10년간 1년 단위로 농축 관련 연구 계획을 IAEA에 보고한다
• 아라크 중수로는 P5+1 합의하에 재설계하며 플루토늄 생산설비는 파괴하고, 15년간 중수로 건설을 금한다
• 사용후 핵연료는 외국으로 반출하고 재처리하지 않으며, 중수도 15년간 보관하지 않는다

사찰과 투명성

• IAEA는 이란 핵활동을 단계별로 감시·승인할 채널을 만들고 모든 핵시설을 정기 사찰한다
• 사찰단은 25년간 광산·제분기·옐로케이크(우라늄산염) 생산 등 이란의 우라늄 공급망과 변환과정에 접근권을 갖는다
• 원심분리기 생산시설도 가동 중단되며 사찰단은 20년간 이 시설에 대한 접근권을 갖는다

제재

• 합의사항을 이행하면 유엔의 제재를 해제하며, 안전보장이사회의 대이란 결의도 무효화하거나 수정한다
• 이행 기간 동안 미국의 제재는 유지되나, IAEA가 이란측 이행조치를 확인할 때까지 제재를 보류한다
• 이행계획 참가국들간 이견을 해소할 절차를 만들되, 이를 통해 이란의 불이행 사항이 해결되지 않으면 유엔은 다시 제재를 부과한다

[참고]

[원문]

Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Program

Media Note

Office of the Spokesperson

Washington, DC

April 2, 2015

Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We will work to conclude the JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months.

Enrichment

• Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation centrifuge.
   
• Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years.
   
• Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.
   
• All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.
   
• Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years.
   
• Iran’s breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework.

Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium

• Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years.
   
•  Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only – into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center.
   
• Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years.
   
• Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years.
   
• Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring.

Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years.

• Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.
   
• Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.
   
• Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.
   
• For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.

Inspections and Transparency

• The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies.
   
• Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret program.
   
• Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.
   
• Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous surveillance.
   
• All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.
   
• A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology – an additional transparency measure.
   
• Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.
   
• Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country.
   
• Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of construction of new facilities.
   
• Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.

Reactors and Reprocessing

• Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production.
   
• The original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the production of significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will be destroyed or removed from the country.
   
• Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime.
   
• Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and development on spent nuclear fuel.
   
• Iran will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the modified Arak reactor, and will sell any remaining heavy water on the international market for 15 years.
   
• Iran will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.

Sanctions

• Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments.
   
• U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place.
   
• The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant non-performance.
   
• All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency).
   
• However, core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities – will be re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPOA and urge its full implementation. It will also create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will serve as a key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution.
   
• A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA participant, to seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPOA commitments.
   
• If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.
   
• U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal.

Phasing

• For ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and development – ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its longer-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan it shared with the P5+1.
   
• For fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program. For instance, Iran will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium and accept enhanced transparency procedures.
   
• Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years. Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent, including its significant access and transparency obligations. The robust inspections of Iran’s uranium supply chain will last for 25 years.
   
• Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program.